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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
would not be available but for its initial bid. Second, the incentive to
make tender offers for more than 10 percent of a company's stock
would be seriously diminished since the maker of an unsuccessful take-
over offer might be deprived of any gain by the unilateral maneuvers of
a target corporation. Since tender offers are important means to effect
an appreciation of stock or to replace inefficient management, their
discouragement would be detrimental to stockholders of target corpora-
tions.
It would indeed be anomalous to deprive stockholders of potential
benefit through a mechanistic application of section 16(b) which was
designed to protect such stockholders. The Second Circuit, by recog-
nizing the value of tender offers,81 has avoided this anomaly.
SIPC - A FIRST IMPREsSION
SEC v. Alan F. Hughes, Inc.
Created by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (1970
Act),8 2 the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) is a non-
profit membership corporation 83 whose fundamental objective is to
provide financial protection for the customers of failing brokers and
dealers (broker-dealers).8 4 SIPC encountered its initial constitutional
challenge in SEC v. Alan F. Hughes, Inc. 5 where the Second Circuit
held that the statutory scheme under which customers of a broker-dealer
are adjudicated to be in need of the protection of the 1970 Act is con-
sistent with due process. The application of the statutory scheme, the
court opined, was proper as evidenced by the record before it.86
All persons registered as broker-dealers under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193487 and all persons, with certain specified exceptions,88
81 The Second Circuit has previously provided protection for tender offerors. In Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (1969), the court held an investor liable
under sections 9a(2) and 10(b) to a tender offeror whose offer was effectively negated by
defendant's fraudulent manipulation of the price of the target company's stock.
8215 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. (1970).
83 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2). SIPC has all the powers, unless inconsistent with the 1970 Act,
conferred upon a corporation under the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act.
Id. § 78ccc(a)(3).
84 1 SIPC ANN. REP. 6 (1971). The term broker-dealer will be used to describe those
brokers and dealers who are registered under section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78o) and those who are members of a national exchange. See Gates,
The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: A New Federal Role in Investor Protection,
24 VAND. L. REv. 586 n.2 (1971).
85 461 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972).
86 Id. at 981.
87 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970).
88 See 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2)(B) (1970). Those excepted from the membership require-
ment include persons whose "business as a broker or dealer consists exclusively of (i) the dis-
tribution of shares of registered open end investment companies or unit investment trusts,
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who are members of a national securities exchange are members of
SIPC. It is primarily from assessments 0 based upon the gross reve-
nuesP-1 of these members that the SIPC fund is financed. There are,
however, several other sources of monies available to SIPC. 92
When SIPC is made aware98 that a member firm is "in or is
approaching financial difficulty," 94 it must make a decision as to the
financial stability of that firm. 5 If it is found that the broker-dealer has
failed or is in danger of failing to meet its obligations to customers 6 and
that at least one of five other conditions prevail,97 SIPC may98 file an
(ii) the sale of variable annuities, (iii) the business of insurance, or (iv) the business of
rendering investment advisory services to one or more registered investment companies
or insurance company separate accounts .... " Id.
89 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2)(B) (1970). In addition, any person not eligible for membership
within subsection (a) "may become a member of SIPC under such conditions and upon
such terms as SIPC shall require." Id. § 78ccc(f)(l). As of December 31, 1971, it was re-
ported that there were approximately 4,000 members of SIPC. 1 SIPC ANN. REP. 11 (1971).
The largest SIPC membership affiliation, for purposes of the SIPC assessment, was with the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. See 1 SIPC ANN. REP. 11 (1971).
90 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(c) (1970). SIPC has been given the authority, by
by-law or rule, to impose an assessment upon its members as it may deem "necessary and
appropriate" to establish and maintain the SIPC fund. Id. § 78ddd(c)(2). This power, how-
ever, is not as extensive as it may first appear. The rate of general assessment may be in
excess of one-half of one percent of gross revenues, a minimum assessment; but, in order
for such an assessment to be made it must be determined that there will be no "material
adverse effect on the financial condition of [the SIPC] members or their customers." In no
event may there be an assessment in excess of one percent. Id. § 78ddd(c) and (d). See I
SIPC ANN. RE'. 14 (1971). Once the fund reaches a level of approximately $150 million
it is expected that assessments will vary as between classes of SIPO members. Id. at 16. See
15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(c)(2) (1970).
91 The term "gross revenues" is defined in the 1970 Act at § 78ddd(i).
92 Among these other sources of funds available to SIPC are: funds held by any trust
which was established by a self-regulatory organization prior to January 1, 1970, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ddd(e); borrowing from financial institutions pursuant to written agreement, id.
§ 78ddd(f); income on its investments; borrowing from the SEC, which can borrow from
the Treasury, id. § 78ddd(g) and (h).
93 See 15 U.S.C. § 78eee (1970). The SEC or any self regulatory organization must
notify SIPC of any information which it possesses and which fosters a belief that a SIPC
member is "in or is approaching financial difficulty." Id. § 78eee(a)(1).
94The term "financial difficulty" has not been defined. See I SIPC ANN. REP. 19
(1971).
95 See 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(2) (1970). It has been observed that a significant effect of
the notice requirement of this section has been to cause the self-regulatory organization
to more actively seek indications of financial weakness. I SIPC ANN. REP. 22 n.34 (1972).
96 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(2) (1970). SIPO maintains that this is the most crucial question
and the most difficult one for which facts must be collected. 1 SIPC ANN. REP. 22 (1971).
97 The five conditions, at least one of which must be found, are that the SIPC mem-
ber-
(i) is insolvent within the meaning of section 1(19) of Title 11, or is unable
to meet its obligations as they mature, or
(ii) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of section 21
of Title 11, or
(iii) is the subject of a proceeding pending in any court or before any agency
of the United States or any State in which a receiver, trustee, or liquidator for
such member has been appointed, or
(iv) is not in compliance with applicable requirements under the 1934 Act
[Vol. 47:370
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application with the appropriate district court 9 for the appointment of
a trustee. 100 Such an appointment will initiate liquidation proceedings
in accordance with the 1970 Act,101 and, if necessary, permit the ad-
vancement of SIPC funds to the trustee'02 as a means of satisfying
certain customers' claims against the member firm.103
or rules or regulations of the Commission or any self-regulatory organization with
respect to financial responsibility or hypothecation of customers! securities, or
(v) is unable to make such computations as may be necessary to establish
compliance with such financial responsibility or hypothecation rules or regulations.
15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(1)(A) (1970).
98 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(2) (1970). The filing of an application is discretionary with SIPC;
however, if SIPC refuses to act the SEC has the authority to apply to a federal court
for an order requiring SIPC to seek a decree adjudicating the customers of a member to
be in need of the protection available under the 1970 Act. 15 U.S.C. § l8ggg(b). One
basic explanation for the discretionary aspect of the application may be the fact that
SIPC is authorized only to liquidate a firm. It may not reorganize a member in any
manner. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78fff (1970).
99 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(2) (1970).
100 Id. § 78eee(b)(3). While a trustee appointed pursuant to the 1970 Act has the
same powers and title with respect to the debtor and the debtor's property, and the same
rights to avoid preferences, as would be given a trustee under Chapter X of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1970), the SIPC trustee, in addition, may operate the
debtor's business to complete "open contractual commitments." 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b)(1)
(1970). He may also hire those persons he deems necessary to facilitate the liquidation. Id.
Both of these powers may be exercised without court approval. Id.
101 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(3) (1970). The 1970 Act states that the liquidation proceeding
is to be conducted:
in accordance with, and as though it were being conducted under, the provisions
of Chapter X and such of the provisions (other than section 90(e) of Title 11) of
Chapters I to VII, inclusive, of the Bankruptcy Act as section 502 of Title 11 would
make applicable if an order of the court had been entered directing that bank-
ruptcy be proceeded with pursuant to the provisions of such Chapters I to VII
15 U.S.C. § 78fff(c)(1) (1970). It has been noted that the effect of this section is to
integrate proceedings under the 1970 Act with straight bankruptcy and corporate reor-
ganizations procedures under the Bankruptcy Act. 1 SIPC ANN. REP. 24 (1971). The result
is less than desirable due to the inconsistencies of these various proceedings and their
fundamental objectives. See id. at 24 n.38.
102 See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(t) (1970).
In order to provide for prompt payment and satisfaction of the net equities
of customers of debtor, SIPC shall advance to the trustee such moneys as may be
required to pay or otherwise satisfy claims in full of each customer, but not to ex-
ceed $50,000 for such customer ...
Id. If the advance is for the purpose of covering a customer's claim for a cash loss, it may
not exceed 20,000. Id.
SIPC is entitled to be subrogated to the claims of certain customers for whom advances
are made to the trustee. Id. § 78fff(f)(1) (1970). This provision, however, need not be
exercised in order for SIPC to recover advances made to the trustee for the completion
of "open contractual commitments." SIPC is entitled to priority to all claims payable
from the "single and separate fund" for this amount. Id. § 78fff(d). See generally note 103
infra.
103 In abrogating section 60(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, the 1970 Act has created three
classes of claimants to a SIPC member's assets. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff (1970); 1 SIPC ANN. REP.
25 (1971). Generally, these are: (1) those who can "specifically identify" their property in the
hands of the debtor, (2) those entitled to share pro rata in a "single and separate fund,"
and (3) those not in either of the two preceding categories who share in the remaining
assets of the debtor with other creditors. Id.
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The contention in SEC v. Alan F. Hughes, Inc.10 4 was that the dis-
trict court's appointment of the trustee under the 1970 Act had denied
appellants, Alan F. Hughes, Inc. and Alan F. Hughes,10 5 due process
because SIPC had not given them notice and a hearing as to the deter-
mination that there was a danger that Alan F. Hughes, Inc. would fail
to meet its obligations to its customers within the meaning of the 1970
Act.1 6 Essential to this assertion was the argument that section 5(b)
(1)107 of the 1970 Act precludes a district court from making its own
finding as to whether a SIPC member is in danger of failing to meet its
obligations to its customers. 108
Appellants' argument was rejected by the court upon the theory
that "SIPC's determination is merely a preliminary step" and, "in and
of itself, has no binding legal consequences and deprives no broker-
104 461 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972). The SEC is a party to the action because an equity
receiver was appointed for Alan F. Hughes, Inc. prior to appointment of the SIPC trustee.
In its annual report SIPC remarked that in most cases in which it had filed applications,
its action has been subsequent to or concurrent with the SEC's application for an injunc-
tion and appointment of a receiver. This rationale springs from a reluctance by SIPC
to invoke liquidation proceedings unless they are absolutely necessary. See I SIPC ANN.
REP. 8 (1971).
Appellants, in this case, in addition to a claim of denial of due process, also chal-
lenged this aspect of the procedure, i.e., they contested the appointment of a receiver.
The Second Circuit held that the SEC had presented sufficient evidence to the district
court to support its application for the appointment of a receiver. 461 F.2d at 983. Fur-
ther, the court noted that the district court had made such an appointment in order to
conserve the assets of the appellant while SIPC was making its determination. Id.
The appointment of a receiver is not a power which is expressly granted in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 3 Loss, SEculrrms RGuLATION 1510 (2d ed. 1961). Rather,
the power is regarded as a form of ancillary relief available through a general grant of
equitable jurisdiction, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), and the regulatory goals of the SEC. See
Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 919 (1961). The issue was directly decided in the affirmative in SEC v. H. S.
Simmons & Co., 190 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), and it is now well accepted that the
federal courts may appoint an equitable receiver upon the application of the SEC. See,
e.g., SEC v. Charles Plohn & Co., 433 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1970); Lankenau v. Coggeshall
& Hicks, 350 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1965).
An important distinction to be maintained between an equity receiver and a SIPC
trustee is that the receiver is to preserve the assets of the debtor and liquidate them only
if the exigencies of the moment mandate such, whereas a SIPC trustee can only liquidate
the assets of the debtor. See SEC v. Bartlett, 422 F.2d 475, 477 (8th Cir. 1970); Lankenau
v. Coggeshall & Hicks, 350 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1965); Esbitt v. Dutch-American Mercantile
Corp., 335 F.2d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 1964); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v.
SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960); 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(c)(1) (1970).
105 Alan F. Hughes was the principal stockholder, a director, and president of Alan F.
Hughes, Inc. The latter was a member of SIPC by virtue of its being a registered broker-
dealer within the 1970 Act. 461 F.2d at 977.
106 See note 97 supra.
107 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(1) (1970).
108 See note 110 infra. It was agreed by the parties that the trustee could proceed
during the pendency of the appeal with his duties under the 1970 Act. He could not,
however, proceed with the actual liquidation of the member firm. 461 F.2d at 979.
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dealer of property."'1°9 It was conceded that a literal reading of section
5(b)(1)(A) 110 would place the constitutionality of the 1970 Act in
question,"' since a SIPC application could be granted even though
there was no showing that the broker-dealer was in danger of failing to
meet its obligations to its customers."12 Basic rules of statutory construc-
tion, however, were cited by the court in its finding that the statutory
scheme was consistent with due process. 13 The court concluded that
due process mandates that the district court make its determination as
a result of a de novo proceeding "rather than from some lesser process
merely involving judicial review of the initial administrative deter-
mination.""x4
With regard to the issue of a de novo hearing, the court held that
the record in this case did not support an allegation by the appellants
that the appointment of the trustee had violated their right to due
process. 15 It was remarked that "the [district] court did not rely solely
109 Id.
110 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(1)(A) (1970).
A court to which application is made pursuant to subsection (a)(2) of this
section shall grant the application and issue a decree adjudicating that customers
of the member named in the application are in need of protection under this
chapter if it finds that such member [is within one of the five conditions listed
as a prerequisite to SIPC's filing of an application with the district court] ....
Id. (emphasis added). See notes 96 & 97 supra.
111 461 F.2d at 980.
112 Id.
113 461 F.2d at 980, citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). The court re-
garded the question as being one of interpreting legislative intent, and presumed that
the Congress would not seek unconstitutionality. 461 F.2d at 980.
114 461 F.2d at 979. Due process, in essence, mandates an "opportunity to be heard."
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). When this opportunity must be granted
depends on the nature of the rights being asserted; nevertheless, the hearing must be
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1965).
For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), a hearing subsequent to the
termination of subsistence benefits could deprive the eligible recipient of his means of
survival, and, thereby, affect his means or ability to properly contest the termination.
In its recognition that the state's interest in preserving funds did not override the indi-
vidual interest, the court, in Goldberg, implicitly accepted a theory that private interests
could be overridden under proper circumstances. 397 U.S. at 266. A balance, therefore,
is to be struck between the private and public interests involved in a particular case
when one considers the timing of a hearing. See R. A. Holnan & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d
127, 132 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253
(1947).
There is provision in the 1970 Act by which a member firm can consent to the SIPC
application to a district court. In the event of a consent, it does not appear that a hearing
is required. See 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(f)(l)(B); 1 SIPC ANN. RE. 23 (1971).
115461 F.2d at 981. Due process establishes certain minimum requirements for the
scope of a hearing, regardless of its timing. The hearing must be "appropriate to the
nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950). Professor Davis indicates that the nature of the hearing may be influenced by the
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upon oral statements made during the hearing.... Rather, the court
relied upon all the evidence which had been accumulating from the
time the .. . [action was] initially commenced."""' SIPC, in fact, had
conceded at the district court proceeding that the court should make
its own finding about the ability of Hughes, Inc. to meet its obligations
to customers within the meaning of the 1970 Act.117 On the facts of the
case, the Second Circuit found that the district court had recognized its
responsibility under the 1970 Act, and that its responsibility had been
fulfilled upon sufficient evidence." 8
The importance of the decision rendered by the Second Circuit in
this case stems not from the complexity of the issues involved, but
rather from the fact that it is a case of first impression.119 In SEC v.
Alan F. Hughes, Inc. the court made the initial adjudication of consti-
tutional considerations under the 1970 Act.120
ARBITRATION
Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld
Coenen v. Pressprich
An apparent conflict between stock exchange rules and provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
was resolved when the Second Circuit, in separate cases, held 1) that a
non-member may use the rules of an exchange to compel a member
firm to arbitrate a dispute and 2) that a member firm may likewise
compel an allied member to arbitrate.
In the first case, Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld,121
the non-member defendant, alleging breach of a common stock pur-
chase contract,122 had commenced arbitration proceedings before the
question to be resolved. If a case places "adjudicative facts" in dispute, a trial seems best
suited. I DAvis, ADMINISTRATVE LAW TREATIsE § 702, at 413 (1958).
The complex fact questions raised in a determination as to the financial stability of
a SIPC member are of an adjudicative nature and, therefore, worthy of a due process
hearing. No such hearing was guaranteed upon the initial determination and, as the
Second Circuit concluded, a cursory review of the initial findings would not remedy the
due process issue. See generally 461 F.2d at 979 n.8.
116 461 F.2d at 981.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 982.
119 Id. at 976.
120 Prior to the instant case the only other aspect of the 1970 Act which had been
adjudicated was the question of retroactivity. It was held in Loff v. Casey, 330 F. Supp.
856 (D. Colo. 1971) (mem.), aff'd, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,589 (10th Cir.), that the
1970 Act affords protection only to the customers of those firms which were actually in
business on or after the effective date of the legislation. In the Loff case the firm seeking
1970 Act status had been adjudicated a bankrupt prior to December 30, 1970. Id. at 857.
121 451 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1971).
122 Axelrod had contracted to purchase five thousand shares of On Site Energy Sys-
[Vol. 47:370
